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ABSTRACT  22 
 23 
In 2004, President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya refused to sign a 24 
popular bill on National Social Health Insurance into law.  25 
Drawing on innovations in framing theory, this research provides 26 
a social explanation for this decision. In addition to document 27 
review, this study involved interpretive analysis of transcripts 28 
from 50 semi-structured interviews with leading actors involved 29 
in the health financing policy process in Kenya, 2014-2015.  The 30 
frame-critical analysis focused on how actors engaged in 1) 31 
sensemaking, 2) naming, which includes selecting and 32 
categorizing, and 3) storytelling.  We demonstrated that actors' 33 
abilities to make sense of the Bill were largely influenced by 34 
their own understandings of the finer features of the Bill and 35 
the array of interest groups privy to the debate.  This was 36 
reinforced by a process of naming, which selects and categorizes 37 
aspects of the Bill, including the public persona of its primary 38 
sponsor, its affordability, sustainability, technical 39 
dimensions, and linkages to notions of economic liberalism.  40 
Actors used these understandings and names to tell stories of 41 
ideational warfare, which involved narrative accounts of policy 42 
victory and defeat.  This analysis illustrates the difficulty in 43 
enacting sweeping reform measures and thus provides a basis for 44 
understanding incrementalism in Kenyan health policy.45 
 3 
INTRODUCTION 46 
In 2004, President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya refused to sign a Bill 47 
on National Social Health Insurance into law.  It was promptly 48 
dismantled and, over a decade, the oldest health insurance 49 
agency in Africa - Kenya’s National Hospital Insurance Fund 50 
(NHIF) – become mired in allegations of corruption and 51 
organizational disfunction (Künzler, 2016). This would prove 52 
pivotal in the development of the Kenyan health system. This 53 
paper seeks to understand the forces that shaped the President’s 54 
decision.  55 
 56 
Research of this nature is needed to inform future policy 57 
processes and mitigate negative consequences. Nevertheless, 58 
health policy research in low- and middle-income countries 59 
(LMICs) has engaged in only a limited way with politics (de 60 
Leeuw et al., 2014). This is particularly true for research on 61 
universal health coverage (UHC) (Rizvi et al., 2020).  More 62 
research is needed to understand policy processes such as policy 63 
diffusion (Gautier et al., 2018) and the mobilization of ideas 64 
in health financing (Chemouni, 2016).  Thus, some have called 65 
for a new generation of social protection research, using 66 
approaches such as framing analysis, to account for complex 67 
social processes in LMICs (Jawad, 2019). This research addresses 68 
these concerns by using an interactive form of framing theory, 69 
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derived from critical policy studies, to provide a social 70 
explanation of the causes and consequences of policy failure in 71 
Kenya’s quest for UHC.   72 
 73 
Over the last decade, global health advocates have rallied 74 
around a campaign to promote Universal Health Coverage (UHC), or 75 
complete access to quality, affordable health care (WHO, 2013).  76 
This led to the inclusion of UHC in the post-2015 development 77 
agenda where it features prominently in the UN’s Sustainable 78 
Development Goals (UN, 2015a, 2015b).  According to former 79 
Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO), 80 
Margaret Chan, UHC “is the single most powerful concept that 81 
public health has to offer” (Chan, 2012).   82 
 83 
UHC scholars argue that “political will” or “political 84 
commitment” is a necessary precondition of successful movement 85 
towards UHC (Balabanova et al., 2013; Nicholson et al., 2015; 86 
Yamey and Evans, 2015).  Yet most of the research to-date has 87 
largely been descriptive (Brearley et al. 2013; McIntyre et al. 88 
2013) or focused on economic dimensions (Knaul et al., 2012; 89 
Mills et al., 2012).  Only recently have researchers studied the 90 
sociopolitical process of UHC reforms (Fox and Reich, 2015; 91 
Harris, 2017; Sparkes et al., 2019). By introducing a conception 92 
of framing analysis (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016) to health 93 
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policy, this work provides a deeper, situated understanding of 94 
the political dynamics at play in a country that has struggled 95 
to make substantial progress towards UHC (Barasa et al., 2018).  96 
Focusing on how meaning is constructed intersubjectively in the 97 
policy process furthers our understanding of an otherwise opaque 98 
and problematic situation.   99 
 100 
The research presented here addresses this gap by using framing 101 
theory to understand UHC-oriented health financing policies in 102 
Kenya, a country that has indicated high-level support for the 103 
movement.  The purpose of this research is to gain additional 104 
policy-relevant insights into the health financing policy 105 
process in Kenya through a framing analysis of the 2004 Bill on 106 
National Social Health Insurance.  Actors often referred to this 107 
Bill as the “Ngilu Bill”, after its primary champion Charity 108 
Ngilu, then Minster of Health (a position now called Cabinet 109 
Secretary of Health).  For this reason, we refer to it as the 110 
“Ngilu Bill” throughout this paper. 111 
 112 
 113 
THEORY AND METHODS  114 
Critical policy studies is a branch of scholarship that examines 115 
decision-making in political settings and the practices of 116 
policy analysis (Fischer et al., 2016). A key focus of inquiry 117 
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is on the social construction of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 118 
1967) following principles of interpretation (Taylor, 1971) in 119 
order to render value-conflicts understandable.  In this vein, 120 
“frame-critical policy analysis” was developed in the 1990s to 121 
analyze, and potentially resolve, protracted policy 122 
controversies that arise from competing worldviews (Rein and 123 
Schön, 1996).  Donald Schön and Martin Rein (1994) defined 124 
policy frames as “taken-for-granted assumptional structures… 125 
derived from generative metaphors… effecting the transition from 126 
statements of fact to judgements of value” (viii). They called 127 
this transition the “normative leap” (Ibid).   128 
 129 
Van Hulst and Yanow (2016) shifted the analytical focus of 130 
framing analysis from the static concept of ‘frames’ to the more 131 
dynamic focus on ‘framing’ as an active process, whereby the act 132 
of framing involves ‘sense-making,’ ‘naming’ (i.e. selecting and 133 
categorizing), and ‘storytelling’.  In this way, they provide an 134 
account of frame analysis that focuses less on frames and more 135 
on the process of framing (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016). In this 136 
article, we consider the interactive process through which UHC 137 
was framed at a key juncture in Kenya. 138 
 139 
The concept of framing has been used in variety of disciplines 140 
to understand the health policy process (Koon et al., 2016).  141 
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This article deploys a constructivist account of framing as 142 
developed by van Hulst and Yanow (2016).  Following Mead (1934), 143 
Goffman (1959), and Weick (1995), van Hulst and Yanow (2016) 144 
conceptualize framing as a process of sensemaking, involving the 145 
intersubjective construction of meaning among policy actors. 146 
Through the process of selecting, naming, and categorizing, 147 
actors “highlight some aspects of a policy discourse while 148 
occluding and even silencing others” (Van Hulst & Yanow 2016; 149 
p.100). Naming refers to the features of this selection that 150 
must be communicated, often through specific rhetorical and 151 
symbolic devices, such as metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). 152 
While naming is central to Schön and Rein’s theory (1994), Van 153 
Hulst and Yanow incorporate the concepts of selecting and 154 
categorizing into their framework.   155 
 156 
According to Van Hulst and Yanow (2016), the process of 157 
selecting constructs a problematic policy situation so that it 158 
concerns certain actors in a particular way. Categorizing, 159 
meanwhile, gives meaning to objects, events, acts, and actors 160 
often through their association with and differentiation from 161 
other social objects and practices(van Hulst and Yanow, 2016).  162 
Drawing on Rein and Schön’s earlier work on ‘problem-setting’ 163 
(Rein and Schön, 1977) and Deborah Stone’s concept of ‘causal 164 
stories’ (Stone, 1989), Van Hulst and Yanow (2016) identify 165 
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storytelling as a key component of the framing process that 166 
allows actors to situate various aspects of an issue into a 167 
broader narrative, helping to explain the emergence or 168 
resolution of a persistent policy problem.  In this way, 169 
ideational features of framing take on a less static, more 170 
dynamic, and politically interactive means of negotiating 171 
meaning in the policy process (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016). 172 
 173 
We used four distinct data-collection methods. First, we used 174 
academic literature on the health sector, policy studies and 175 
relating to Kenya.  Second, we examined published reports, 176 
position papers and government documents identified throughout 177 
the research process.  Third, we conducted semi-structured in-178 
depth interviews. These interviews, their location, tone, the 179 
nature of the dialogue, characteristics of the interviewer, and 180 
reflections on physical space were all seen as important 181 
features of the data.  This was captured through field notes 182 
(our fourth dataset) that accompanied each interview.  Since 183 
field notes were not systematically coded in the same way as the 184 
text of the interview transcript, these served as reference 185 
points throughout the course of analysis and interpretations of 186 
findings, but are not directly cited.   187 
 188 
A total of 50 interviews were conducted by X from May 2014 to 189 
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March 2015 in Nairobi, Kenya. Interview participation was 190 
developed through an iterative snowball method (Bernard, 2011) 191 
of identifying principal actors based on relevant documents and 192 
knowledge of their involvement in health policy discussions.  193 
Study participants were recruited via email, phone calls, and 194 
personal contact. The consent form used for this study was 195 
required by the local IRB, X.      196 
 197 
Interview participants were either leaders, high-ranking 198 
members, or financing experts within their respective 199 
organizations (see Table 1).  At the expense of specificity, we 200 
have anonymized quotes from study participants, utilizing broad 201 
professional categories.  Saturation was largely achieved and 202 
few individuals, other than a former Minister of Health/current 203 
Governor of Kitui County (Charity Ngilu) and former President 204 
Mwai Kibaki, were noticeably absent from this cohort.  All 205 
interviews were recorded, transcribed, thematically coded, and 206 
emerging themes analyzed using Dedoose analytical software. We 207 
used the Van Hulst and Yanow (2016) frame-critical configuration 208 
as an analytical framework.  Peer-debriefing was pursued by 209 
presentation of findings at X as well as international 210 
scientific conferences.  Member-checking was enabled through 211 
presentation of preliminary findings to study participants.      212 
 213 
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[TABLE 1: Study Participants] 214 
 215 
The Institutional Review Boards of X in Kenya and X in X 216 






The sense-making process for the Ngilu Bill requires careful 223 
consideration of the political context in which the frame 224 
emerged. Actors’ understanding of party and electoral politics 225 
were tied to their interpretations of how decision-making 226 
processes prevented the bill from being passed. Analysis of the 227 
sensemaking process shows how multiple forces provided a 228 
platform to construct a functional understanding of the Ngilu 229 
Bill and its legislative defeat.  230 
 231 
Sensemaking: The Ngilu Bill  232 
The design of the Ngilu Bill and the legislative process took 233 
place over a period of four years from 2001-2004 (see Table 2).  234 
This process involved significant consultation with technical 235 
partners within and outside the Ministry of Health (MOH), 236 
including international actors such as the German Corporation 237 
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for International Cooperation (GTZ), World Health Organization 238 
(WHO), and the World Bank Group (WBG).  The MOH, led the effort 239 
under a seasoned senior team led by the new Minister of Health, 240 
Charity Ngilu.  As we will demonstrate later, the degree of 241 
stakeholder consultation, particularly with respect to the 242 
private for-profit medical community, was seen as a source of 243 
controversy.  Yet, at least at an early stage, it appears as 244 
though all stakeholders were involved in the initial 245 
consultations during a series of technical missions organized by 246 
MOH.  The principle components of the Bill involved changes in 247 
revenue generation, risk pooling, and purchasing (Carrin et al., 248 
2007).  249 
 250 
[Table 2. Ngilu Bill Timeline] Adapted from (Abuya et al., 2015) 251 
 252 
The Bill proposed significant changes to revenue generation.  It 253 
outlined diverse contributory streams to provide health 254 
insurance through a combination of government revenue and 255 
earmarked taxes, mandatory contributions from formal sector 256 
employees (enhanced through a feature called payroll 257 
harmonization), contributions from employers and the self-258 
employed, and through donations or grants.  Some actors worried 259 
about garnering the earmarked funds from general tax revenue, 260 
and some anticipated a high taxpayer burden.  Though the exact 261 
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percentage to be earmarked for NHIF was never established in the 262 
Bill, the design occurred during a period of economic 263 
uncertainty.  The Bill was perceived to be expensive because 264 
government would be responsible for ensuring financial 265 
protection of the poor. Although there were strong arguments in 266 
favor of basic primary care being covered by the government, 267 
there were concerns about the amount and consistency of funding 268 
from development partners.  The Bill involved a contribution 269 
from employers, which was unprecedented in the health sector, 270 
but not in Kenya; the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) 271 
requires employer contributions, for example.  Still, the knock-272 
on effects of employer contributions resonated with many 273 
stakeholders, as (development partner_02) explained, “[…]even if 274 
it is completely passed onto the employee it would be […] a tax 275 
on businesses and lead to lower growth.”  Thus, many actors 276 
understood that the tax-based mode of increasing revenue for 277 
social health insurance and incorporating employer contributions 278 
was economically problematic. 279 
  280 
In designing the Bill, a reasonable degree of tension existed 281 
around risk pooling.  A problematic dilemma over the quantity 282 
and size of risk pools was debated.  While evidence suggests 283 
that a larger more efficient risk pool is optimal for cross-284 
subsidization purposes (WHO, 2010), many argued that NHIF and 285 
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its perceived shortcomings would damage prospects for 286 
implementation and that competition would raise standards as 287 
well as provide an avenue for private sector participation.  288 
Despite its problems, NHIF was proposed in the 2004 Bill to be 289 
reformed and expanded into a national social health insurer 290 
(NSHIF).  Like the new forms of contributions, understandings of 291 
this feature of the bill were widely contested. As many actors 292 
pointed out, however, the lack of participation from the private 293 
for-profit health sector and the limited scope for private 294 
insurance in a national social health insurance program, created 295 
hostility from private providers and insurers.  The design of 296 
risk pooling in the Ngilu Bill therefore influenced the highly 297 
charged positions sponsored by key members of the private for-298 
profit health sector.   299 
 300 
Purchasing reforms in the Bill also provoked contestation.  301 
Again, the NHIF was seen as the primary vehicle for purchasing, 302 
albeit with enhanced regulatory oversight. Though it was not 303 
explicitly stated in the 2004 Bill, many actors recommended that 304 
a separate entity be established to accredit health care 305 
providers.  Under the Ngilu Bill, providers would be paid a flat 306 
fee per inpatient day and per outpatient visit (though the exact 307 
levels were never finalized).  This was notable because 1) the 308 
move to provider payment mechanisms that standardized financial 309 
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transactions and contained costs (capitation) was viewed 310 
unfavorably by both public and private providers who worried 311 
about getting paid less; and 2) the move into outpatient care 312 
was seen as a threat to the private for-profit health sector 313 
because the current offering for in-patient services through 314 
NHIF was largely viewed as benign. A basic package of in-patient 315 
and outpatient health services was proposed to cover medical 316 
consultation, some specialty care, essential medicines, dental 317 
care, referral, and other costs associated with hospitalization.  318 
The package was to be approved and modified by the NHIF Board 319 
though it did not specify the process, which was concerning to 320 
(private sector _04), “(NHIF) were now going into uncharted 321 
waters where they had never been before. They’d never run an 322 
outpatient scheme…”  Thus, purchasing reforms, including changes 323 
to provider payment mechanisms and enhanced benefits, were 324 
understood to increase the legitimacy of NHIF at the expense of 325 
the private for-profit health community.   326 
 327 
Sensemaking: the policy process 328 
Study participants focused much of their attention on describing 329 
the policy process for the Ngilu Bill.  The explanations usually 330 
followed a particular formula: name the culprit, describe how 331 
their interests were threatened by the Bill, and allude to what 332 
kept the President from signing it into law.  This is important 333 
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because this Bill supposedly received widespread support, was 334 
quickly approved by Parliament, and was literally one signature 335 
away from being enacted.  Speculation about what or who caused 336 
President Kibaki to reject the Bill included naming officials, 337 
interest groups, and party politics.  Those most heavily 338 
involved with the Bill attributed success and failure to the 339 
discursive tactics employed in a strategic framing contest.  For 340 
opponents, how they framed various “issues” when communicating 341 
with the Ministry of Finance (the National Treasury) and the 342 
President were seen as vital explanations for success.  For the 343 
architects of the Bill, their shortcomings were understood to be 344 
shortcomings with the “packaging”, “marketing”, or 345 
“communication” of the Bill itself.   346 
 347 
Sensemaking: Actors and relationships 348 
Central to this understanding of the policy process is the 349 
identity of its key actors.  This includes the Treasury, the 350 
private for-profit health sector, and development partners, 351 
especially the World Bank but in particular the relationship 352 
between the Former Minister of Health (now called Cabinet 353 
Secretary), Charity Ngilu, and President Kibaki.  The social 354 
process of sensemaking constructs a particular understanding of 355 
the motivations and interactions of each.   356 
 357 
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The fact that nobody referred to the Bill as the ‘Kibaki Bill’ 358 
was indicative of Madam Ngilu’s level of ownership.  Though 359 
Ngilu was a member of President Kibaki’s Cabinet as Minister of 360 
Health, she was also a political threat.  An active Member of 361 
Parliament, representing Kitui Central since 1992, Charity Ngilu 362 
was one of the first two women to run for President in Kenya.  363 
Popularly dubbed ‘Mama Rainbow,’ she was appointed Minister of 364 
Health in the Kibaki-led coalition administration of 2003.  365 
Actors inferred that out of sexism, jealousy, or strategic 366 
electoral considerations, President Kibaki failed to support 367 
Ngilu’s aggressive legislative push in 2004, straining an 368 
already fragile relationship.  For example, according to 369 
(government_07), “[…]politics entered.  I think for me, I 370 
thought, these men, they thought Ngilu was going to get 371 
credit[…]”.  Thus, many understood party politics and Ngilu’s 372 
ownership of the Bill were part of Kibaki’s political 373 
calculation in refusing to sign the Bill into law.  374 
  375 
These political circumstances were complicated by the timing of 376 
the Bill’s introduction immediately following the 377 
administration’s decision to enact universal primary education. 378 
“Experts advised that it may be difficult for Kenya to run both 379 
free primary education and social health insurance,” 380 
(government_02).  Multiple respondents also questioned whether 381 
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the Kibaki administration should have expended political capital 382 
on sweeping health reform on the heels of universal primary 383 
education.  In this way, the campaign for the Ngilu Bill was at 384 
least partially hindered by the recent political victory, and 385 
sizable cost of the enacted legislation for free primary 386 
education.   387 
 388 
A frequent explanation for the Ngilu Bill’s failure was 389 
incomplete support from the Treasury.  While Parliament shapes 390 
social policy, Treasury, with its control over the government’s 391 
purse strings, receives special attention from the Executive 392 
Branch.  “The whole issue is convincing the Treasury [...] I 393 
think when Treasury makes up its mind, it does make up its mind 394 
(government_12)”.  Furthermore, President Kibaki, as a former 395 
Minister of Finance, was understood to be particularly sensitive 396 
to economic guidance.  Still, it is unclear why internal, 397 
cabinet-level disagreement (between MOH and Treasury) persisted 398 
within the Kibaki administration.  Ultimately, the lack of 399 
support from the Treasury on grounds of fiscal responsibility 400 
were seen to influence the President’s decision to reject the 401 
Ngilu Bill.    402 
 403 
The Ngilu Bill’s failure emboldened a group of medical 404 
entrepreneurs representing the private for-profit health sector.  405 
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The private for-profit health sector is diverse and includes an 406 
array of interests from medical suppliers, device manufacturers, 407 
pharmaceuticals, providers, health facilities, and insurance 408 
companies.  At minimum, the Ngilu team’s consultations did not 409 
capture this diversity.  Instead they focused on recruiting the 410 
endorsement of providers through the Kenya Medical Association 411 
(KMA).  Respondents suggested that this was likely due to the 412 
fact that KMA’s leadership has historically consisted of private 413 
providers and KMA occupies a key position on the NHIF Board of 414 
Directors.  But, in hindsight, their influence was more limited 415 
than presumed by the Bill’s sponsors.   416 
 417 
Finally, a select group of development partners, led by the 418 
(WBG), was influential.  While on the one hand some development 419 
partners assisted with the technical design of the reform, 420 
others expressed uncertainty about its implications. According 421 
to (development partner_03), “It was a simple thing that we had 422 
donors, who were asking a question, if this bill goes through, 423 
what is our role?” Some present in high level discussions with 424 
Treasury and the President, understood that an influential 425 
former Minister of Finance from Senegal at WBG cast doubt on the 426 
macro-economic consequences and scientific basis for such 427 
reforms.  Regardless, this involvement by development partners 428 
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was discouraging to health advocates and seen as a key link in 429 
the President’s line of reasoning.   430 
 431 
In summary, sensemaking across actors and organizations provides 432 
a descriptive account of the technical dimensions of the Ngilu 433 
Bill, actor identities and relationships, and the policy process 434 
surrounding the Ngilu Bill.  However, we still need to 435 
understand how and why actors behaved – or changed their minds – 436 
as they did.  The following sections on Naming and Storytelling 437 
add depth and nuance to the account of how and why the Bill came 438 
to be rejected.    439 
 440 
Naming, Selecting and Categorizing 441 
Naming, selecting, and to a lesser extent, categorizing are all 442 
important tactics used by both sides of the debate.  443 
Personification of the Bill, appeals to affordability and 444 
sustainability, and reframing policy measures, were all 445 
important naming processes that contributed to the Bill’s 446 
defeat. Also, by categorizing the Bill as a health sector 447 
governance issue and linking the debate to Kenyan conceptions of 448 
free enterprise, opponents of the Ngilu Bill were able to 449 
position their arguments in way that touched on contested values 450 
in Kenyan society.   451 
 452 
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Naming: Selecting Charity Ngilu 453 
Though it is unclear where or when actors began using the 454 
shorthand “Ngilu Bill,” this form of personification among 455 
policy actors was notable for rechanneling the symbolic power of 456 
Charity Ngilu.  Given Ngilu’s background, her impassioned 457 
support, and her position as one of the first female politicians 458 
in Kenya, the Bill was likely attached to preconceived notions 459 
of gender and patronage in the political sphere.  This tactic 460 
served to isolate the primary champion from a broader 461 
constituency and trivialize the debate.  In so doing, it 462 
undermined the sponsors’ claim that the Bill was a rational, 463 
economically feasible policy proposal.  At the very least, the 464 
attachment of the Ngilu persona to the Bill had a polarizing 465 
effect.      466 
  467 
Framing the Bill as unaffordable 468 
The Bill’s adversaries were effective in their characterizations 469 
of the Bill as “unaffordable” and “unsustainable.”  Though there 470 
were extensive technical debates within Ngilu’s team as to the 471 
affordability of the proposal, its architects derived scenarios 472 
for phasing it over five years.  Despite considerably less 473 
financial expertise, key private for-profit health sector 474 
representatives used their own “data” to demonstrate to opinion 475 
leaders how they understood the Bill to be financially unsound. 476 
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According to (journalist_01), Ngilu’s team “did a poor […] PR 477 
job on it,” and opponents, “[…] gave us numbers, they gave us 478 
excel (spreadsheets),” warning against the Bill’s economic 479 
implications.    480 
 481 
While the affordability frame served to condense the macro-482 
economic concerns into a comprehensible narrative, it’s possible 483 
that Kibaki himself was concerned about cost. Ignoring counter 484 
explanations from the Bill’s architects, President Kibaki 485 
deferred to Treasury.     486 
 487 
Opponents also reframed a particular revenue collection feature 488 
of the Bill, called “payroll harmonization,” in their 489 
discussions with powerful interest groups.  Because teachers 490 
occupy the largest segment of the formal economy, for example, 491 
their union (KNUT) enjoys a position of power in negotiations 492 
with the state.  Teachers’ medical allowances were to be 493 
consolidated under the Ngilu Bill.  Some argued MOH was vague on 494 
this point. This strategic framing opportunity was reportedly 495 
uncovered by private for-profit actors in a thorough stakeholder 496 
mapping.  Next, they used informal networks to meet with KNUT 497 
and explain “what it means” (see storytelling section).  Without 498 
KNUT support, the Ngilu Bill was perceived as financially 499 
unsound.  This was then relayed to Treasury unbeknownst to the 500 
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Ngilu team.  “By the time we went to Parliament, the teacher's 501 
union was saying […] this thing can’t fly and […] we are not on 502 
board,” (private sector_06).  Hence, the ability of the private 503 
sector to reframe payroll harmonization and persuade KNUT to 504 
join them strengthened their position when lobbying to Treasury 505 
ahead of the Ngilu team.  506 
 507 
Framing the Ngilu Bill as unsustainable 508 
The Bill also was characterized as “unsustainable.”  In this 509 
way, actors questioned the long-term viability of the Bill and 510 
the complex conditions that must be created for it to succeed.  511 
Obscuring the provision and financing of health services, the 512 
Bill’s opponents argued that it established unrealistic 513 
expectations for material investments in health service delivery 514 
platforms, with steep political consequences for failure.  This 515 
portrayal likely resonated, regardless of its veracity (the 516 
Ngilu Bill envisioned financing, not delivering services).  In 517 
much the same as concerns about affordability, respondents 518 
seemed to understand that legitimate sustainability concerns 519 
were never adequately addressed by the Bill’s sponsors.   520 
 521 
Framing NHIF within the Ngilu Bill as a “Monopoly” 522 
Opponents of the Bill also categorized one of its salient and 523 
perceived shortcomings by naming the enhanced NHIF as a 524 
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“legislated monopoly.”  Some actors understood that the proposed 525 
policy limited private insurance participation, threatening free 526 
market principles.  According to some, the fact that parastatals 527 
were “born out of monopoly” made the private for-profit health 528 
sector nervous that the government was reverting back to its 529 
populist past.  Their arguments in favor of choice and free 530 
enterprise were therefore colored with appeals to modernity and 531 
economic progress.  A logical extension of naming NHIF a 532 
monopoly was to question its legitimacy.  This was clear in the 533 
description of a planned court action against the Bill, “[…]It 534 
was literally treason, we are creating parallel government […] 535 
an institution that was unconstitutional,” (private sector_06). 536 
By naming the newly formed N(S)HIF a legislated monopoly, 537 
opponents also drew on a legacy of corruption and incompetence 538 
associated with NHIF.  According to (private sector_07) during  539 
consultations, “They [Treasury] said that if they [NHIF] can't 540 
use 100 shillings well […] how are they [NHIF] going to manage a 541 
thousand.”   In this way, opponents of the Bill were able to 542 
shift the debate to the extreme and thus create more room for 543 
favorable compromise.   544 
 545 
Framing the Ngilu Bill as providing “free healthcare” 546 
Some indicated that sponsors’ efforts to categorize the Bill as 547 
one of “free healthcare” were problematic.  This was framed as 548 
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such given the recent legislative victory on “free education.”  549 
In a moment of self-reflection, architects of the Ngilu Bill 550 
admitted to misgivings about how political operatives in the 551 
team “marketed” the Bill as “free healthcare,” which raised many 552 
questions about fairness of financial contribution.  According 553 
to (development partner_08), “Although technically the thing was 554 
sound, then how we packed it, the marketing of it, I think we 555 
could have done better.” 556 
 557 
This demonstrates the importance of naming the Bill in ways that 558 
garner support while limiting its contestability. Not only did 559 
opponents of the Bill successfully portray polarizing 560 
dimensions(through personification with Ngilu, characterizing 561 
NHIF as a “legislated monopoly”, and the Bill as unaffordable 562 
and unsustainable), but also other names were unsuccessful in 563 
building a coalition of support (such as “free healthcare”).  564 
Furthermore, naming works synergistically with sensemaking, 565 
approaching the “normative leap” suggested in the original 566 
conception of frame-critical policy studies.  Looking at the 567 
emotional and cognitive work of storytelling, however, provides 568 




The highly charged nature of the debates surrounding the Ngilu 572 
Bill revealed at least two forms of storytelling illustrating 573 
the exercise of power and change in the policy process: 1) 574 
stories of resistance and 2) stories of betrayal.  The principle 575 
actors from the private sector involved in countering the Bill 576 
frequently told stories of resistance in which they cast 577 
themselves as unlikely victors.  This included militarized 578 
accounts of conflict to highlight agency in the policy process, 579 
as well as emotional validation to explain implications for 580 
future policy. On the other side, the Bill’s sponsors told 581 
stories of betrayal in which they were naïve victims of a bitter 582 
policy dispute.  This included painful depictions of betrayal to 583 
account for agency in the policy process, as well as emotional 584 
frustration to explain its effects on subsequent agenda-setting.  585 
In this section, we show how various elements of storytelling 586 
“emplot” (Mattingly, 1998) features of the debate into a larger 587 
and more persuasive narrative.  By taking a closer look at these 588 
instances of “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) we can gain a 589 
better understanding of the interplay of agency, emotion, ideas, 590 
and identity in providing a basis for human behavior in the 591 
policy process.   592 
 593 
Stories of resistance 594 
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In describing the context and overall approach to contestation, 595 
some actors used the symbolic language of war in telling stories 596 
of resistance.  This conveyed urgency and desperation, weaving a 597 
narrative arch from characterizing participants, generating 598 
revenue, and forming alliances, to engaging media and 599 
politicians.  In the story of contesting the Ngilu Bill, actors 600 
readily acknowledged that ideas were wielded in efforts to 601 
persuade.  This was particularly true in discussions with the 602 
President (see Table 3).     603 
 604 
The narrative (encapsulated by private sector_06 in Table 3) of 605 
how the private for-profit representative “distilled the issues” 606 
in an attempt to win the President’s support is notable for two 607 
reasons.  First, the actor presented an urgent, and “methodical” 608 
argument.  Because each of these touched on distinct domains and 609 
were attached to political risks, they were likely to, at the 610 
very minimum get the President’s attention.  This narrative 611 
incorporated cognitive elements of names mentioned previously 612 
like “unsustainable” and “unaffordable”. Second, (as confirmed 613 
by multiple interview respondents) this account explicitly 614 
locates the source of the President’s written dissent: a 615 
memorandum drafted by private for-profit health representatives 616 
and forwarded directly to Parliament.   617 
 618 
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This process required actors to tap hidden networks of power and 619 
influence.  As (private sector_07) explained, “Actually, I have 620 
begun to define power by how many phone calls I am from the 621 
President […] I think I consider myself a tier two.” The actor 622 
then explained the informal way opponents were able to gain an 623 
audience with KNUT in order to reframe payroll harmonization as 624 
an effort by MOH to take money from teachers.    625 
 626 
The outcome of this conflict was characterized in several ways.  627 
First, politically it was expensive as Ngilu and Kibaki “ceased 628 
to see eye to eye,” (private sector_06).  Second, it polarized 629 
participants in the policy process, which led to a period of 630 
intense policy stasis and scandal over the next decade. Third, 631 
private for-profit opponents of the Bill banded together and 632 
formed a professional association, supporting similar counter-633 
movements in Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and further afield in 634 
West and Southern Africa.   635 
 636 
Finally, stories cast doubt as to whether the Ngilu Bill truly 637 
failed or simply fragmented into smaller policy positions.  For 638 
example, actors point to recent debates over provisions in the 639 
national health financing strategy as evidence that “[…] the 640 
discussions have still gone on.  [The Ngilu Bill] is in 641 
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everyone's memory […] So it's not completely forgotten,” 642 
(private sector_06). 643 
 644 
 645 
Public Sector Stories of Betrayal 646 
Stories of betrayal explain how the narrative and thus public 647 
support was ceded in the policy process.  Their accounts of 648 
betrayal are all the more painful because they embarked on an 649 
elaborate process of generating public support, stakeholder 650 
endorsement, and internal consensus.  Similarly, the Ngilu team 651 
believed in their cause and described their authentic pursuit of 652 
policy change.  For example, early in the process, the team was 653 
divided as to whether they should “get ahead” of a sensitive 654 
report detailing the cost of the Ngilu Bill.  According to 655 
(private sector_05), Ngilu herself claimed that leaking to the 656 
press was “irresponsible” and that Kibaki was a friend of hers.  657 
Accounts such as these underscore the value of framing and the 658 
strategic process by which the Ngilu team attempted to influence 659 
public opinion.   660 
 661 
Actors told stories of betrayal on multiple fronts, including by 662 
Treasury, KNUT, Kibaki, private for-profit providers, and 663 
development partners in the policy process.  Of these, a meeting 664 
with Treasury was considered to be particularly critical.  The 665 
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Ngilu team met with Treasury on a Sunday; they spent all morning 666 
debating the bill and were met with resolute disagreement by 667 
Treasury officials.  Revealing an affinity for issue framing, 668 
the team concluded that this was a lost opportunity as somebody 669 
had already been to Treasury and persuaded them. Perhaps more 670 
damaging, the confidential report debated between Treasury and 671 
the Ngilu team was leaked to the press, which caused the Bill’s 672 
advocates to lose control of the narrative.  It became a 673 
“feeding frenzy” of journalists, and the narrative shifted to 674 
Cabinet level in-fighting which pitted ministries against one 675 
another.  In this public dispute, Ngilu herself was portrayed as 676 
reckless and financially irresponsible.   677 
 678 
These stories carry important repercussions.  First, they 679 
illustrate how stories of betrayal damaged the relationship 680 
between Ngilu and Kibaki. Second, the stories account for the 681 
ways in which Ngilu herself became angry, dismayed, and even 682 
“scarred” by betrayal.  Third, they explain how this affects 683 
agenda-setting for current efforts to move towards UHC in Kenya 684 
(see Tables 3 and 4). 685 
 686 
This narrative informs how storytelling functions in policy 687 
processes.  In describing the political fallout from the Ngilu 688 
Bill, a participant linked this to the current policy agenda in 689 
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health, illustrating a “normative leap” characterized by Schön 690 
and Rein (1994).  Because of his unique expertise, this finance 691 
expert claimed to have worked years ago in the banking industry 692 
with the current President, Uhuru Kenyatta, as well as the 693 
Cabinet Secretary of Health (at the time of his interview).  He 694 
claimed to occasionally offer informal advice to the new Cabinet 695 
Secretary.  His concluding thoughts (see quote from “private 696 
sector_05” in Tables 3) reveal important insights as to the 697 
agenda-setting process, and the large shadow that the Ngilu Bill 698 
casts over the health sector. 699 
 700 
 701 
DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS 702 
This article provides much needed analysis of the political 703 
process through which UHC reforms are pursued.  The use of 704 
framing theory provides an important account of developments in 705 
the health policy process recognizing the ways in which social 706 
structures shape actors’ behavior and choice but at the same 707 
time are subject to change as a result of human agency (Gamson 708 
et al., 1992).  The UHC literature is vague on the importance of 709 
agency in the policy process; countries that have made strides 710 
towards achieving UHC have benefitted from strong executive 711 
leadership and political windows of opportunity (Atun et al., 712 
2015; Reich et al., 2016).  Yet, what this analysis reveals, is 713 
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that even with strong leadership and a favorable political 714 
climate, framing matters.  Moreover, our research suggests that 715 
strong leadership is actually knowing how to effectively frame 716 
issues in ways that galvanize large ‘coalitions of interests’ 717 
(Schattschneider, 1960), which in turn shapes the political 718 
environment. 719 
 720 
Our research contributes to theoretical advances around the role 721 
of agency by framing scholars in critical policy studies. 722 
Research on Dutch coastal management has demonstrated the 723 
utility of deconstructing the sensemaking process in framing 724 
(Aukes et al., 2018).  Reimagining Kingdon’s “policy 725 
entrepreneur” (Kingdon, 1984) as an interpretive actor, Aukes et 726 
al. (2018) argue that unusually influential policy actors define 727 
problems in others’ terms, take risks, and engage in a variety 728 
of framing interaction mechanisms to enhance their epistemic 729 
community.  We found that private for-profit actors in our study 730 
were tacitly understood to be interpretive policy entrepreneurs.  731 
They actually reframed the Ngilu Bill as the problem instead of 732 
the solution, and maintained policy stasis by defining the 733 
political risks in clear terms to the President (see Tables 3 734 
and 4).  Moreover, they detailed professional risks in pursuing 735 
aggressive political action, often relying on military tropes 736 
(see Table 4).  Through a process of “frame accommodation” 737 
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(Dewulf and Bouwen, 2012), President Kibaki forwarded the 738 
memorandum drafted by these interpretive entrepreneurs to 739 
Parliament to explain his dissent.  The experience caused these 740 
individuals to form a professional association, and “incubate” 741 
comparable organizations in neighboring countries, thus 742 
enhancing the epistemic community.   743 
 744 
We argue, however, that the interpretive entrepreneur model is 745 
incomplete. We found that naming (including processes of 746 
selecting and categorizing) as well as storytelling have a 747 
unique and persuasive effect in conjunction with sensemaking.  748 
By focusing specifically on sensemaking, the interpretive policy 749 
entrepreneur does not have a clear discursive basis for defining 750 
problems in others’ terms or taking risks.  In addition to this, 751 
it seems that entrepreneurship mediated by framing interactions 752 
would do more than simply enhance the epistemic community.  Our 753 
research suggests that policy, as a social construct, is 754 
reconstituted as a result of framing, as are actors’ identities 755 
and relationships with one another.  More interpretive research 756 
on framing is needed to further our understanding of complex 757 
phenomena around agency and its role in the policy process.   758 
 759 
Through framing, our research provides rare insight into the 760 
politics of emotion in agenda-setting research. This is 761 
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consistent with theoretical developments in critical policy 762 
studies that call for an analytical shift from subjective 763 
accounts of what emotions are to collective interpretations of 764 
what emotions mean in the policy process (Durnová, 2018).  For 765 
example, in explaining fallout from the Ngilu Bill, the final 766 
storyteller links emotional pain to specific priority-setting 767 
guidance (see Table 3).  In this way, Rein and Schön’s normative 768 
leap (from what is to what ought to be), is symbolically 769 
amplified by emotion.  Reconstructing experience in this way, 770 
lends authenticity to a particular interpretation of the 771 
“political spectacle” (Edelman, 1988), a finding consistent with 772 
UHC research on health workers in Kenya (Koon et al., 2017).  773 
Furthermore, appeals to emotions such as anger or anxiety are 774 
relatively unaffected by evidence (Stucki and Sager, 2018), a 775 
point demonstrated by the Ngilu team’s inability to persuade 776 
based on technical guidance.   777 
 778 
In this respect, we demonstrate how health financing debates 779 
draw on underlying values as opposed to evidence-informed policy 780 
positions.  Often, research is solicited to lend authority to 781 
the preferences of actors and as a symbolic means of 782 
demonstrating sound judgement (Boswell, 2009).  This was 783 
particularly present in the use of evidence by the private 784 
sector in opposition to the Ngilu Bill.  Epistemic power is 785 
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pronounced in health financing, which is commonly perceived to 786 
be an enterprise germane to economists and actuaries; however, 787 
the Kenyan experience demonstrates that decision makers are not 788 
altogether financially fluent and struggle to grasp the nuances 789 
of data meant to persuade.  Instead, evidence assumes a 790 
‘performative quality’ (Smith and Stewart, 2015).  Nevertheless, 791 
the Kenyan experience suggests evidence crafted to mobilize 792 
ideas can be particularly useful in dealings with Treasury, who, 793 
by virtue of being the primary steward of government finances, 794 
is a uniquely persuasive frame sponsor.  As the Ngilu Bill 795 
demonstrates acutely, however, evidence can, “inform, but cannot 796 
determine policy choices” (Hawkins and Parkhurst, 2015). 797 
 798 
Finally, our research proposes that health financing reforms are 799 
often incremental in nature, making them particularly sensitive 800 
to reconstruction and reinterpretation.  We argue, for example, 801 
that the Ngilu Bill didn’t fail, but rather was fragmented into 802 
several smaller policy positions, some of which have recently 803 
been legislated (Barasa et al., 2018).  In fact, many of the 804 
countries that have made progress toward UHC have made small 805 
incremental gains over time (Lagomarsino et al., 2012; 806 
Balabanova et al., 2013; Maeda et al., 2014).  In this respect, 807 
the lessons from the Ngilu Bill are instructive.  A 808 
comprehensive overhaul of the health financing architecture was 809 
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highly contested, at least in part because of the scale and 810 
urgency of the proposed reforms.  Moreover, a plurality of 811 
actors in the health arena as well as a diverse and market-812 
oriented economy, make sweeping changes in the Kenyan health 813 
sector seemingly impossible to enact devoid of significant 814 
external political shocks.  Instead, recent experience (Barasa 815 
et al., 2018) illustrates how health financing in Kenya is 816 
marked by smaller, incremental changes that provide less 817 
inspiring, but equally salient markers of social progress.   818 
 819 
Limitations  820 
This study had several limitations.  First it relied heavily on 821 
semi-structured interviews with key informants about a policy 822 
process several years ago.  Because interviews were conducted 823 
several years after the Ngilu Bill was contested, some 824 
stakeholders worked hard to recall vividly their experiences.  825 
Second, this research would have benefitted from the 826 
deconstruction and interpretation of alternative sources of data 827 
including legislation and news media.  Further engagement with 828 
the historical basis for social phenomena and their impact on 829 
political systems (such as electoral politics) would further 830 
extend the reach of frame-critical policy analysis.  Third, we 831 
had difficulty in adequately distinguishing between categorizing 832 
and selecting, as features of the naming process.  These 833 
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challenges notwithstanding, the present analysis demonstrates 834 
the value and relevance of further frame-critical policy 835 
analysis.  836 
 837 
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Table 1: Description of Participants 995 
 996 
 997 
Interview Participants Number 
Government employees (NHIF and MOH) 12 
Development Partners 11 
Professional associations and unions 9 
Private for-profit health sector 8 
Politicians (MPs and Senators) 5 
Academics 3 











President instructs ministers to develop a plan for creating mandatory National 
Social Health Insurance (NSHI) for all Kenyans 
2001 
Delegates adopt resolution for “right to health” in the constitution and task force 
recommends NSHI 
2002 Cabinet adopts resolution for the creation of NSHI 
2002 
Minister of Health appoints intersectoral task force to prepare national strategy and 
Draft Bill on NSHI with private sector input 
2003 
Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation includes 
measures to transform NHIF into National Social Health Insurance Fund (NSHIF) 
2003 
MOH requests technical support from GTZ/WHO to assist with implementation 
once Bill is passed by law 
2003 
1st technical mission to review strategy and draft bill, which would become 
parliamentary sessional paper no. 2, 2004 
2003 
2nd technical mission assess legal aspects of Bill, design of benefits package, 
provider payment mechanisms, and transition of NHIF to NSHIF 
2003 3rd technical mission assess health insurance governance and financial feasibility 
2004 
4th technical mission assess progress towards implementation, management reforms, 
and establishment of working group 
2004 5th technical mission reviewing progress and developing strategic milestones 
2004 
6th technical mission assessing financial projections and training with a financial 
simulations tool 
2004 National Assembly debates Bill and passes through Parliament unanimously 
2004 President refuses to sign the Bill into law, sent out for further stakeholder input 
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Table 3. Framing the Ngilu Bill 1006 
 1007 
Framing Dimensions  
Sensemaking Bill’s financing provisions: revenue collection, pooling, purchasing;  
 
Policy process: public deliberation over expansion of social services;  
 
Actor identities and relationships: Minister Charity Ngilu, President Mwai 
Kibaki, Treasury (Ministry of Finance), MOH, Private for-profit providers, 
Development partners (particularly the World Bank & GIZ) 
 
Naming “Ngilu Bill”, “(legislated) monopoly”, “unaffordable”, “unsustainable”, “free 
healthcare” 
 
Storytelling Resistance – Conflict (action), 
validation (emotion) 
 
normative leap exemplar (action) 
 
“We were there before [Ngilu’s team] 
and we had a written memorandum 
with questions.  […] We had distilled 
the issues; because we realized unless 
we go issue based, on the basis of the 
popularity, we lose hands down, so the 
only way was to make an operational 
case and a financial case. To say, ‘this 
is why this can’t fly.’  You can’t 
register 40 million Kenyans in one 
year. So, because we are looking at it 
operationally - can NHIF manage to 
implement the Bill?- and then 
economically - can we as a country 
afford the things that we’re being sold? 
[…] So we went to the president with a 
political case: the risk of failure. First, 
we showed it will fail. Then we pointed 
out what failure would mean 
politically. And, we indicated why we 
thought it would fail. It was quite a 
methodical approach.  So that is the 
memorandum that now got sent to 
parliament as the reason the president 
rejected it.” (private sector_06) 
Betrayal – Deception (action), 
frustration (emotion) 
 
normative leap exemplar (emotion) 
 
“[The Ngilu Bill] was hot…very, 
very difficult. And, since the real 
unfortunate thing for me, after that 
failure…even the current Cabinet 
Secretary, I believe when he looks 
back, he knows that, ‘so do you want 
to go through that?’  So universal 
health care is something that is 
scarred, something that for you to 
pick it up, you must really have guts, 
and you must be prepared to fight 
[for], […] So is this the thing you 
really want to do? Or, should you 
just say, ‘I’m Cabinet Secretary. I 
have five years. I want to achieve 
these five things,’ and you do them.  
I mean, if I was him…I don’t 
know…if I was him, I would have 
five things, but this would be 
number five, not number one.” 








Exemplars for Agency Exemplars for emotion 














Deception Executive backchanneling 
Leaking to news media 
Doubt  
Issue reframing – payroll 
harmonization 
Narrative control  
Feeding frenzy 
Inter-ministry value conflict 
Dismay 
Angry 
Nightmare 
A blow 
Scar 
Concern 
Fear 
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